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ABOUT THIS EVENT 
The Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies convened 
Security Sector Reform: The Art of Assessment from March 23-26, 
2009, in Monterey, California, to explore ways of improving assessment 
design and implementation and enhancing local ownership and the 
sustainability of assessments and reform-driven programs. Fifty 
mid- to senior-level stabilization and reconstruction practitioners 
gathered to discuss best practices for developing security sector 
reform frameworks and evaluate key lessons from past assessments. 
Participants represented a diverse array of actors, including US 
and international government civilian agencies, armed forces, 
intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental organizations, 
education and research institutions, and consultancies, among others.  
The Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies
(CSRS) is a teaching institute which develops and conducts 
educational programs for stabilization and reconstruction 
practitioners, including representatives from US and 
international non-governmental organizations, 
intergovernmental organizations, government civilian agencies, and the 
armed forces. Established by the Naval Postgraduate School in 2004 through 
the vision and congressional support of Representative Sam Farr (CA-17), 
CSRS creates a wide array of programs to foster dialogue among 
practitioners, as well as to help them develop new strategies and refi ne best 
practices to improve the effectiveness of their important global work. 
Located at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, CSRS also 
contributes to the university’s research and graduate degree programs. For 
more information about CSRS, its philosophy, and programs, please visit 
www.csrs-nps.org. TABLE OF CONTENTS
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Many stabilization and reconstruction 
practitioners recognize that 
transforming the security sector 
is a vital fi rst step in establishing 
the stability required to carry out 
long-term development initiatives. 
Strengthening the organizations 
that provide security services and 
promoting transparent, democratic 
governance can contribute to 
creating an enabling environment 
where other initiatives can take 
root. Of equal importance, reform 
efforts also help mitigate some of 
the conditions that lead to confl ict 
and restore public confi dence in 
the state. According to a US Agency 
for International Development 
paper, SSR programs should seek to 
accomplish six critical objectives: 
develop accountable and professional 
security forces, develop capable and 
responsible civil authorities, give high 
priority to human rights protection, 
foster a capable and responsible 
civil society, abide by the principle 
of transparency, and create regional 
approaches to security problems.1
However, there is often tension 
between the host nation’s needs and 
priorities and the donor country’s 
national interests in supporting SSR 
that can be diffi cult to navigate and 
resolve. In addition, donors often 
Executive Summary
1
Security sector reform can help shore 
up a fragile state by promoting 
transparent, democratic governance 
and strengthening organizations that 
provide security services. ”
“
Workshop participants included S&R 
actors who have been instrumental 
in developing security sector reform 
frameworks and assessments for use in 
fragile and failed states around the world.
1  Nicole Ball, “Promoting Security Sector 
Reform in Fragile States,” US Agency for 
International Development, PPC Issue Paper 
No. 11, April 2005, 8-9.
focus on improving processes, while 
national actors may prefer to focus 
on solving very specifi c problems.2
As a consequence, SSR seeks to 
align competing actors’ interests 
to produce tangible results over 
both the short and long-term. State 
resources and the capacity of all 
stakeholders, including recipient 
and donor countries, are limited, 
necessitating a prioritization and 
balancing of initiatives. There 
may be instances, however, where 
the direction in which national 
stakeholders want to take an SSR 
program does not coincide with donor 
priorities. In such circumstances, a 
political accommodation will need to 
be reached or the donor will need to 
withdraw support.
Recognizing that forcing SSR on an 
unwilling recipient dooms a program, 
practitioners should support the 
aims of host nation stakeholders 
to strengthen their political will 
for reform efforts and to build the 
capacity required to sustain new 
systems and services long after 
donors have departed. 
National actors typically engage in 
SSR to promote their self-interests, 
one of which is to augment the 
powers of a centralizing state. 
Whatever their rationale, there must 
be political will for SSR initiatives to 
take root. Many donors view SSR as 
a prerequisite for development work 
and will exert considerable pressure 
on host governments to commit to 
reform. Nonetheless, host nations 
must own the process, as reform 
efforts involve systemic changes 
to their institutions and processes 
and will continue years after donors 
depart. National actors should set 
the priorities, determine the entry 
points, and design and implement 
the programs. Donors will provide 
valuable funding and technical 
support, but serve as enablers rather 
than drivers of SSR initiatives. 
External and national actors should 
strive to build a broad agreement 
with the diverse array of stakeholders 
present in a state, including political 
leadership, state and non-state 
security and justice providers, and 
civil society, understanding that 
competing interests will inevitably 
remain despite their best efforts and 
intentions. National actors must also 
manage the tensions between state 
and non-state providers effectively, 
as non-state providers will likely 
provide the majority of security and 
justice services and are viewed as 
legitimate or even favored providers 
by local citizens.
Despite the fact that SSR is viewed 
as a prerequisite to state building, 
actors still struggle with core issues 
around conducting the assessments 
that serve as the vital foundation 
for subsequent program design 
and implementation efforts. “We 
often can’t get our hands around 
justice and security sector reform,” 
said an SSR practitioner. “The 
complexity is enormous and the 
stakeholders change constantly.” 
In addition, actors who pursue 
an iterative approach to SSR 
often face pressures from donors 
and national stakeholders who 
want immediate results. To help 
practitioners explore these issues, 
the Center for Stabilization and 
Reconstruction Studies (CSRS) 
hosted Security Sector Reform: The 
Art of Assessment, an interactive 
workshop with 50 mid- and senior-
level practitioners representing an 
array of organizations, including 
US and international government 
civilian agencies, armed forces, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), 
intergovernmental organizations 
(IGOs), education and research 
institutions, and consultancies. The 
workshop used a mix of focused 
discussions, case studies, and 
scenarios to discuss SSR goals, best 
practices, and mitigation strategies 
for addressing challenges that arise 
during the assessment process. 
The goal was to build collective 
knowledge on assessments and 
how best to conduct them, so that 
participants could use best practices 
and key learnings from case studies 
in future fi eld work. Participants, 
who hailed from countries as various 
as Afghanistan, Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, France, Germany, Indonesia, 
Italy, Japan, Nepal, the Netherlands, 
Nigeria, Peru, the Philippines, 
Sweden, Switzerland, the United 
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2  Alex Martin and Peter Wilson, “Security Sector 
Evolution – Which Locals? Ownership of 
What?” in Local Ownership and Security Sector 
Reform, ed. Timothy Donais, Geneva Centre 
for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 
November 2008.
Learning Objectives
Security Sector Reform was designed to help participants 
achieve the following learning objectives:
 •  Review state-of-the art assessment methodologies 
among practitioner organizations
 •  Debate the biases and issues outside evaluators bring 
to the assessment process
 •  Discuss methods to include indigenous and 
non-state perspectives
 •  Expand cross-community professional networks  
Kingdom, and the United States, had 
extensive experience designing and 
implementing SSR frameworks and 
assessments in fragile states around 
the world. As such, they brought a 
wealth of strategic and practical 
insights to workshop discussions. 
Through focused discussions, case 
study presentations, and hands-
on scenarios, participants shared 
their experiences with designing 
and implementing SSR assessments. 
Some of the questions participants 
considered were:
•  What are the core criteria that 
indicate state readiness for 
security sector reform? How do 
external actors manage competing 
tensions, such as a host nation’s 
unwillingness or lack of readiness to 
engage in SSR with their own desire 
to engage? Are there circumstances 
under which donors and external 
actors should temporarily table SSR 
program implementation to await 
more fortuitous conditions, even 
if their national interests dictate 
immediate action?
•  How can actors design and refi ne 
comprehensive assessment 
frameworks? What are some of the 
best practices around assessment 
tactics — including team size, 
staffi ng, timeframes, and data 
gathering strategies? 
•  What are the best tools and 
processes to leverage? And what 
gaps exist in assessment tools that 
still need to be addressed? 
•  How can actors mitigate challenges, 
such as organizational mandates, 
scarce resources, legal restrictions, 
and overlapping or fragmented 
responsibilities, which can limit 
their effectiveness when they are 
conducting assessments in the fi eld?
•  How should teams prepare for 
an assessment to ensure that 
their time on the ground is as 
fruitful as possible? And how can 
they maximize the likelihood 
that they will acquire accurate, 
comprehensive information when 
they are interviewing stakeholders 
who have their own biases and will 
rationally and inexorably promote 
their own self-interests?
•  When SSR practitioners design 
assessments, should they attempt 
to learn everything possible 
about a host nation’s institutions 
or processes? Or should they 
focus intensively on a few 
critical issues, using an iterative 
approach to gain more knowledge 
about the country context and 
needs as they support the initial 
phases of SSR implementation?
•  What are the priorities for SSR and 
the best entry points for action? 
Given that host nations will set the 
reform agenda, how can external 
actors validate their priorities and 
determine the most profi table 
avenues for engagement? 
•  How can program designers work 
with host governments to create 
a holistic vision for SSR and design 
and sequence the right programs, 
managing expectations and 
Pictured: Mr. Constantine Xefteris, US Joint Forces Command.
Workshop participants discussed the tension 
between external actors’ innate desire to 
achieve a sweeping vision for SSR with 
their recognition that realities on the ground 
require a modest and humble approach, given 
constrained resources, limited political capital, 




leveraging political will to secure 
long-term commitment to working 
toward that vision? And can they 
sell stakeholders on the need for 
a program baseline to measure 
improved performance?
•  How should teams gather and 
validate data in post-confl ict 
environments, when information 
is invariably missing, inconclusive, 
or contradictory? And how can 
they create assessments that 
provide an insightful view of the 
host nation’s security sector, when 
they will necessarily be based on 
incomplete information; refl ect 
the political perspectives and 
priorities of key stakeholders; and 
be dependent on the personality, 
knowledge, and limitations of the 
team on the ground? 
•  How can recommendations be made 
more realistic and operationally 
feasible? Do proposed programs 
meet local needs — or impose 
Western norms that may not be 
appropriate given the country 
context, government priorities, 
and governance structures? And can 
they be funded, transitioned, and 
sustained over the long-term?
•  How can assessors ensure 
the security and well-being 
of stakeholders who provide 
information for the assessments? 
And how should assessment teams 
share fi ndings in such a way that 
national actors will be receptive to 
suggested improvements? 
With its wide-ranging discussions 
and multi-lateral perspectives, 
Security Sector Reform provided 
participants with the opportunity to 
analyze a complex issue that is rising 




CSRS workshops provide participants with the opportunity to discuss challenges, best 
practices, and new trends in the areas of health and humanitarian issues, institution 
building and security sector reform, stabilization and reconstruction skills and tools, 
economic recovery, and maritime and naval affairs.
CSRS Workshops
CREATING OPPORTUNITIES FOR:
      •  Cognitive learning
         •  Practical skills development
            •  Professional, cross-
   community networking
To begin the workshop, facilitator 
Eric Scheye asked participants to 
craft their own working defi nition of 
SSR. While defi nitions varied across 
breakout groups, most participants 
stressed that security sector reform 
represents a whole-of-government 
commitment on the part of recipient 
and donor nations to strengthen and 
transform the host country’s security 
sector and the delivery of justice and 
security, a public good and service. 
Encompassing both a sweeping, 
long-term vision of reform and the 
incremental activities that build up 
to it, practitioners stated that SSR 
seeks to rebuild security institutions; 
fortify civilian governance structures 
and local capacity to administer 
critical functions; provide safety, 
security, and stability to the nation’s 
citizens; support human rights and 
rule of law; and increase the state’s 
responsiveness, accountability, 
and transparency. While all states 
can — and do — reform their 
security sectors, SSR is most often 
undertaken in fragile or failed 
states which have experienced the 
weakening or collapse of critical 
institutions and services. Sometimes 
SSR also involves creating 
institutions from the ground up 
after a particularly destructive 
period of civil strife.
Understanding SSR 
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While all states can – and do – 
reform their security sectors, SSR is 
most often undertaken in fragile or 
failed states which have experienced 
the weakening or collapse of critical 
institutions and services.”
“
Eric Scheye, workshop facilitator, and 
Nick Tomb, CSRS Program Coordinator, 
plan scenario exercises. Participants 
used scenarios to begin creating 
assessments that would address the 
on-the-ground realities of diverse post-
confl ict security environments.
With its emphasis on transformational 
change of a country’s security 
institutions, many of which 
have been leveraged by elites 
to maintain power and enrich 
themselves, SSR is necessarily 
political. There will be both winners 
and losers from reform efforts. 
And some groups, such as military 
and political leaders from both 
predecessor and current regimes, are 
well aware that their authority and 
power is in danger of diminishing. 
SSR teams operate in a highly charged 
milieu, where asking politically 
sensitive questions or sharing 
sensitive data with unapproved 
parties, could have negative, or even 
violent, ramifi cations. As such, SSR 
practitioners must bring far more 
than sectoral, regional, or linguistic 
expertise to their work. They must 
also possess a wide array of abilities, 
including negotiation expertise, keen 
insights into the political climate 
and stakeholder interests, and 
change management skills. As the 
“advance team” for SSR, they may 
also be selling the importance of 
SSR to local stakeholders, working 
with and supporting their host 
nation counterparts in designing and 
implementing programs that refl ect 
the state’s cultural norms, political 
realities, and other needs and can be 
sustained over the long-term. 
The assessment provides an 
important tool for future change 
management efforts, as it creates 
a lens into the current state of a 
nation’s security sector. This data can 
be mined to determine opportunities 
for aligning stakeholder and donor 
priorities and challenges that need 
to be mitigated. It can also be used 
by the host government to determine 
the best entry points for action. If 
grounded in good data, assessments 
can also be used to establish program 
baselines and measure the results 
of programs that are implemented. 
While the assessment is not an end 
to itself, it nonetheless can provide 
practitioners with the political 
and diplomatic cover to develop 
knowledge that will support program 
planning and implementation without 
raising stakeholder expectations to 
unrealistic levels. Since assessments 
invariably raise expectations, SSR 
teams must be proactive about 
shaping them appropriately. 
THE POLITICIZATION OF SSR
“How do you build trust when 
it is clear that you are there for 
a national interest?” asked a 
participant. “The stakeholders aren’t 
naïve; they understand that donor 
priorities are driving work.” 
The term — security sector reform — 
implies that a nation’s systems and 
processes are defi cient and require 
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Luc van de Goor, Government of the Netherlands, shared his insights into his 
nation’s SSR model. 
wholesale revision. This type of 
positioning can prove an impediment 
to building collaborative, trusting 
relationships on the ground. Said 
one participant: “I work with a host 
nation on police reform. When I met 
with the head of the police, he said, 
‘You are here, because we are bad.’” 
Concurred an IGO representative: 
“In our work to rebuild African 
institutions, the offi cers have told 
us, ‘We will not have anything to do 
with you if you call your work reform. 
Just change it to something else.’” In 
this light, the phrase “development” 
may elicit better responses from host 
nation stakeholders and may be more 
appropriate politically.
In some post-confl ict environments, 
on the other hand, the word 
“reform” is presumptuous.  As one 
IGO participant stated: “We do not 
have anything that is even formed. 
We talk about reconstruction when 
there was nothing constructed in the 
fi rst place.” 
Furthermore, even the term 
“assessment” or “needs assessment” 
can be threatening, signifying a shift 
in power and attack on national 
sovereignty. Imagine if a foreign 
country — even an ally like Canada 
or the United Kingdom, entered the 
country to conduct an “assessment” 
of the US security sector, one 
participant mused. Would the US 
government be willing to provide 
an SSR team with sensitive or even 
classifi ed information about its 
security forces? 
However, successful SSR assessments 
can be used to build awareness of — 
and consensus around — the need for 
change. Said a participant:
If you do the assessment in the 
right way, it can create awareness 
about how bad the country’s system 
is. That approach is very different 
from coming in to ask a few 
questions and then leaving to write 
a report. It’s much more powerful 
if you can help your counterparts 
answer those questions for 
themselves. It helps create the 
political will for reform.
Although SSR teams typically develop 
the questions they ask host nation 
stakeholders, it may be even more 
benefi cial if they can help their 
host nation counterparts ask the 
questions themselves.
SSR practitioners should display 
political and cultural sensitivity and 
avoid stigmatizing institutions and 
processes — which also necessarily 
stigmatizes local actors. If SSR 
practitioners position their work 
more appropriately, they can 
reinforce a state’s commitment to 
rebuilding its systems and processes 
and involve civil society in the 
reform process. If they position it 
poorly, however, they could gain, at 
best, superfi cial commitment and 
compliance. “If you get down to 
the real politics of the situation,” 
said an NGO representative. “A 
donor is going to have a hard time 
saying, ‘I gave you $50 million, but 
we’re equal partners.’ The host 
nation will tell us what we want to 
Tobias Pietz, Center for International Peace Operations, and Ana Kantor, Swedish 
National Defence College, share their perspectives on the tensions that arise between 
donor and host government priorities for SSR initiatives. 
The terms — security sector reform and 
assessments — signify a shift in power 
and attack on national sovereignty. While 
donor countries would be loathe to turn 
over sensitive or classiﬁ ed information, 
they routinely expect this type of 




hear and create façades, so that 
they can get a paycheck.” Or the 
perception of being on the losing side 
of a power play may cement host 
government intransigence. “There 
is a presumption that donors and 
implementing countries have all the 
power,” said a participant. “That’s 
simply not true. Local people can 
outwait donors.”
Either response will short-circuit 
SSR’s potential. National actors are 
in the best position to determine 
their priorities and which initiatives 
will strengthen the capacity and 
capabilities of state and non-state 
security and justice providers, while 
addressing critical issues. The goal is 
to create a highly responsive security 
and justice system: one that does not 
simply meet current needs, but also 
evolves to keep pace with a changing 
society. To accomplish this objective, 
a host nation will need to involve 
stakeholders at all levels, so that 
ownership is truly “local” and reform 
efforts benefi t ordinary citizens in 
communities throughout the state, 
not just elites. 
Participants discussed how national 
actors, faced with the potential loss 
of power may sometimes acquiesce 
to an assessment for one reason only: 
so that they can maintain full control 
of the process. In such a scenario, 
potential spoilers may be senior 
members of the recipient government 
who ostensibly “cooperate,” simply 
because they view the political risk of 
explicit opposition as more dangerous 
to their self-interest than short-term 
acquiescence.
STATE READINESS
Participants discussed the fact that 
national interests can sometimes 
blind donors to political and other 
realities that indicate a lack of 
state readiness for SSR. Said an 
international government civilian 
agency participant: 
Sometimes your state department 
will tell you to go and do 
something. You come back and say 
this is red all over. Do you still 
want to do it? And the answer is 
yes. The purpose of the assessment 
is to determine whether something 
is achievable or not. If the policy 
makers say that it is important, 
you have to do the best you can, 
and what is the algorithm for that? 
The policy makers have the fi nal 
say. If they want to waste money, 
you have to waste money. 
So what is the chief criteria for 
beginning SSR work? Participants said 
that senior stakeholder commitment 
to change was absolutely crucial. 
“When you engage in SSR, you need 
a high-level stakeholder in the host 
country who is willing to work this 
issue. There must be political entry 
points for you to build upon,” said 
an international government civilian 
Sue Tatten, United Nations Development Programme, offered her insights into 
rule-of-law and customary justice in Southern Sudan. 
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agency participant. Practitioners 
can test state readiness by asking 
governments to commit to diffi cult 
deliverables over a sustained period 
of time.
Launching SSR programs when states 
lack the political will or capacity to 
help drive them is high risk politically 
— as well as of considerably 
questionable effectiveness and 
effi cacy. Participants advocated 
that practitioners push back and 
urge donors to table initiatives until 
conditions are more conducive for 
the systemic change these initiatives 
require. However, external actors 
are primed to engage and will often 
overlook troubling warning signs 
so that they can move ahead with 
development programs. 
LOCAL OWNERSHIP AND 
SUSTAINABILITY
 
Actors must avoid the temptation of 
forcing SSR on host nations, simply 
because the donor or donors have 
built the assessment capacity or 
national interests dictate this type of 
involvement. “How do you make sure 
that you’re responding to demands, 
rather than pushing programs on 
countries that don’t want it?” asked 
a participant. Participants also 
stated that SSR teams should take a 
“whole-of-government approach,” 
as much as is feasible, using a 
consultative process in working with 
the host nation to involve the full 
range of stakeholders in gathering 
information, evaluating different 
entry points for action, designing 
and implementing programs, and 
monitoring and evaluating results. 
Best practices include having a 
senior-level stakeholder champion 
efforts and involving civil society 
organizations and non-state 
providers, not just state institutions, 
in reform efforts. 
As they conduct their assessments, 
SSR teams will encounter a plethora 
of stakeholders representing 
confl icting interests. Participants 
discussed the challenge of building 
trusting and cooperative relationships 
with these diverse individuals and 
groups, who are deeply suspicious 
of each another, yet are all integral 
to reform initiatives. Actors must 
seek to build local stakeholders’ 
confi dence by creating an enabling 
environment for sharing ideas, 
protecting sensitive data, and 
delivering on commitments. 
SSR actors are typically in country 
for a fi nite period of time to launch 
reform initiatives. While donors are 
willing to provide funding for the 
initial stages of SSR, they rarely 
provide monies and technical support 
for the decade or more required to 
create transformative change. As a 
consequence, external actors will 
need to support host governments’ 
efforts to build local capacity that 
will withstand the departure of donor 
funding and technical support. 
To build support for the hard changes 
required by SSR, most practitioners 
will pair reform programs with 
development efforts that deliver 
highly visible short-term benefi ts. 
Pictured in foreground, from left to right: Robert Perito, US Institute of Peace, and 
Dr. William Durch, Henry L. Stimson Center.
As they conduct their assessments, SSR teams 
will encounter a plethora of stakeholders 
representing conﬂ icting interests. One of 
the team’s critical tasks is to build trusting, 
cooperative relationships on the ground, without 




Such efforts can reduce violence 
and corruption and plant the seeds 
of an economic recovery, but may 
be challenging to sequence and can 
create community ill-will if citizens 
perceive that certain groups are 
being favored over others or are not 
held accountable for past violations. 
Said an NGO member: 
We have a chicken and egg 
problem with our work. You can’t 
do development if you don’t have 
security, but oftentimes security 
problems are due to rampant 
poverty. So we create security 
programs as means of achieving 
development objectives, believing 
that if we can give people jobs, 
they won’t kill each other. 
WESTERN VERSUS 
CULTURAL NORMS
SSR practitioners must take care to 
maintain open minds and practice 
cultural sensitivity in their work. 
SSR’s mostly Western practitioners 
will unconsciously bring biases 
into the assessment phase, which 
can infl uence the questions they 
ask, the recommendations they 
make, and the programs they seek 
to design. “Our problem is that 
we come in with very set ideas,” 
said an IGO member. “We’re 
going to train this many police 
or military personnel.” Another 
participant cited SSR actors’ bias 
to set up state-centric judicial 
systems that may not translate to 
certain countries’ judicial systems. 
While it is critical to create new 
systems that promote democratic 
ideals, provide for rule of law, 
enable civilian control, and create 
transparency and fairness, how that 
manifests itself from country to 
country will be quite different. 
Participants discussed the variability 
of non-Western justice systems 
and the prevalence of customary 
law in many parts of the world. 
Host nations frequently maintain 
state and non-state systems 
effectively, successfully resolving 
the tensions between the two: An 
IGO representative said that several 
African countries had harmonized 
two justice and security systems, 
while preserving a stable democracy. 
Local citizens used state and non-
state providers for different services 
and transitioned between the two 
easily. At other times, maintaining 
parallel systems may be nothing 
more than a stop-gap strategy, a 
politically and fi nancially expedient 
means of keeping a fragile peace 
while working towards creating 
systems that protect the rights of 
all citizens, not just certain ethnic, 
political, or religious groups. ••
Oana Mihai, International Organization for Migration, discusses the difference 
between Western and host country norms with Travis Adkins, International 




The international SSR community is 
complex, with multiple nations and 
organizations fi elding assessment 
teams. Nations such the United 
Kingdom, the Netherlands, and 
Sweden fi eld relatively small 
number of SSR practitioners, yet 
are considered world leaders in 
this fi eld. Meanwhile, the United 
States has multiple agencies 
and hundreds of practitioners 
involved in SSR. Although the US 
Government is trying to implement 
a whole-of-government approach, 
it is hampered by its inability to 
determine its full capacity, as 
well as challenges reconciling 
overlapping responsibilities between 
its agencies. Said an European 
government offi cial to his US 
counterparts: “Your problems are 
massively different than mine,” 
citing scale as one of the principal 
issues distinguishing the two. 
In the United Kingdom, the 
Netherlands, Sweden, and Canada, 
agencies participate in national SSR 
steering committees in an attempt 
to create a whole-of-government 
approach to setting strategy, 
SSR Stakeholders 
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SSR actors range from nations that ﬁ eld a 
small number of practitioners to countries 
such as the United States, where multiple 
agencies, hundreds of practitioners, 
and overlapping responsibilities impede 
collective action. ”
“
Participants brought a wealth of insights 
to share with their peers.
developing common frameworks, and 
striving to coordinate assessment 
activities. They also try to provide 
SSR practitioners with a centralized 
pool of fl exible funding to support 
their initiatives, enabling teams to 
respond rapidly to opportunities and 
adapt to changing circumstances. 
Said an international government 
civilian participant: “The money 
defi nes who will be around the table 
and ensures that everything goes 
through certain channels.” 
The United States has set up an SSR 
working group to foster interagency 
collaboration and create a 
shared tool for assessment use. 
The assessment tool has already 
been successfully used in a fi eld 
assignment in Pakistan, where it 
identifi ed a lack of civilian capacity 
to perform required governance 
functions over the country’s 
military and uncovered a critical 
security issue of cattle theft. 
However, there are so many entities 
performing SSR in the US that it 
creates a “cacophony of actors” 
and a “multiplicity of efforts 
overseas” that do not deliver the 
gains they would if initiatives 
were fully coordinated, stated 
an US government civilian agency 
representative. US practitioners 
are aware of the need for better 
interagency collaboration on these 
programs. “It is worth the effort 
to invest in coalition building,” 
said a government civilian agency 
participant. “Not only do you bring 
interdisciplinary expertise into a 
single group, but you also have 
the ability to gain consensus on 
political issues.” 
US government civilian agencies are 
sometimes in the diffi cult position 
of being hampered by organizational 
mandates, legal restrictions, or 
scarce resources that limit the 
scope of work they can perform. 
In addition, they must coordinate 
efforts between country teams; 
their own staff, who typically 
perform the assessments; and the 
consulting fi rms that implement the 
SSR programs. 
Participants shared the strengths 
and weakness of their assessment 
tools. US government civilian 
agencies strive to leverage each 
other’s frameworks, but participants 
acknowledged that it can be diffi cult 
to forge connections with the full 
universe of practitioners and make 
connections with existing programs. 
US government civilian agency 
representatives stated that the lack 
of a centralized SSR budget made 
it challenging to respond quickly 
to opportunities and kept SSR 
initiatives within the province of 
individual agencies. 
While countries such as the 
United Kingdom, Sweden, and the 
Netherlands have or are in the 
process of creating SSR frameworks, 
they may or may not be used 
by all national actors. United 
Kingdom personnel struggle with 
acquiring interagency support for 
development-driven initiatives 
spearheaded by its lead SSR 
agency, the UK Department for 
International Development. They 
also lack a single tool for strategic 
security assessments. Meanwhile, 
practitioners from Sweden stated 
that their current assessment tools 
were overly broad and did not 
capture the full range of issues on 
the ground. 
THE COUNTRY TEAM 
SSR activities are supposed to 
be coordinated through the 
country team. “The reality is 
that sometimes the teams just 
show up,” said a US military 
participant, “which increases the 
ire of the ambassador.” When this 
happens, host nation agencies 
can be easily overwhelmed by 
competing, uncoordinated requests 
to participate in multiple SSR 
assessments, leading to “assessment 
fatigue,” as nation after nation and 
organization after organization send 
in their assessment teams, stated 
a workshop participant. “I don’t 
know what you’re saying. I’m from 
Washington, and I’m here to help,” 
said a US civilian government agency 
representative to group laughter. 
Ms. Monica Tanuhandaru, International Organization for Migration, shares her 
experience working on SSR programs in Indonesia with Matthew Vaccaro, CSRS.
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That comic exchange illustrated the 
dichotomy inherent in embassies’ 
mission: to further national 
interests, while preserving the 
diplomatic relationship. Participants 
discussed the primacy of the country 
team in promoting reform, building 
political will, and working with the 
SSR team to set scope and access 
key players. The country team can 
greatly facilitate the SSR team’s 
work, and SSR teams can provide the 
country team with valuable capacity 
and capabilities it doesn’t possess. 
A country team’s personnel typically 
aren’t trained in SSR and what 
they know may be limited to, as 
one participant said, “how to avoid 
going to prison.” In addition, their 
capacity may just be “one deep,” 
said another, with a single staffer, 
such as a defense attaché, detailed 
to SSR duties. As a consequence, 
“most of what is encompassed in 
SSR falls through the cracks,” said 
a participant. An even worse-case 
scenario is when a country team 
is striving at cross purposes, by 
promoting SSR and then working 
to strengthen the existing military 
without consideration of what the 
SSR program is supporting. “It is the 
kiss of death if the person trying 
to sell F-16s to the host nation is 
also trying to sell SSR,” said an 
international government civilian 
agency participant. 
Country teams can vary considerably 
in their effectiveness. Key factors 
include the personality and political 
stature of the ambassador and the 
size of the embassy. Participants 
stated that smaller embassies may 
have an advantage, as it is easier 
to assemble all the right players in 
a single room for regular meetings. 
For instance, a military participant 
who was working with the Liberian 
Government to create a new 
defense ministry met daily with his 
country team. 
Because the SSR assessment 
team often uncovers unfavorable 
information which could strain 
diplomatic relationships, it should 
clearly differentiate itself from the 
country team. One nation’s SSR 
team does that by stressing the 
assessment team’s independence 
and then inviting host nation clients 
to a workshop to review the report 
and vet its accuracy. Many nations 
choose to develop two reports: one 
for the donor and another for the 
host nation, the latter of which is 
carefully positioned to win political 
support for suggested improvements 
and avoid antagonizing stakeholders. 
LOCAL STAKEHOLDERS
In an ideal world, SSR teams 
will engage with a state that is 
perceived as legitimate by its 
people. Unfortunately, that is 
not always the case. Sometimes 
donors mandate that SSR teams 
work with discredited governments 
that have been responsible for 
perpetrating violence and human 
rights violations. Said a military 
person: “If you go in and associate 
with an illegitimate government, it 
comes with baggage and can have 
nasty repercussions. The concept of 
Andre Abel Barry and Obianuju Nwobi, both of the United Nations Operation in Côte 
d’Ivoire discussed how to involve diverse stakeholders in SSR assessments without 
allying with any one group.
Because the SSR assessment team often 
uncovers unfavorable information which 
could strain diplomatic relationships, it should 
be clearly differentiated from the country 
team. Participants shared different strategies 




doing no harm really comes to the 
fore here.” 
While SSR teams spend much of 
their time evaluating state security 
providers, non-state actors can play 
an equally large role in providing 
security in certain geographies. A 
participant presented an overview 
of the role of non-state actors in 
Africa, where citizens use non-
state actors such as local security 
forces to meet most of their 
security needs. He cited a survey 
that found that 50 and 90 percent 
of African citizens prefer these 
groups to formal actors because 
they provide a wider range of 
options and physical, linguistic, and 
cultural accessibility. Citizens can 
easily walk to non-state justice and 
security providers, speak in their 
fi rst language, and work with them 
to resolve disputes in a culturally 
appropriate manner. In addition, 
some of these providers deliver 
superior services than their police 
counterparts. For example, taxi and 
market associations will typically 
provide much more adequate 
policing of bus stations and markets, 
epicenters of crime, than police. For 
these reasons, citizens view them as 
more legitimate providers of state 
security services. 
While there are tensions between 
state and non-state actors, local 
non-state providers can play an 
important role in stabilizing a 
nation and building legitimacy for 
host government institutions. As 
a consequence, they should be 
considered fully in both assessment 
and programmatic phases. 
As the evaluation of a country’s 
security systems is conducted, it 
is also necessary to undertake a 
parallel effort to assess the state’s 
justice sector, including both 
the formal and informal sector. 
Participants discussed the complex 
interplay of state and non-state 
actors across the justice and 
security sectors. Non-state actors 
may encroach upon formal sector 
responsibilities, or the two may 
work cooperatively. A participant 
stated that he had seen instances of 
police forces turning over individuals 
to non-state courts or working with 
local security providers to fi nd 
persons of interest. Meanwhile, an 
IGO member stated that actors had 
worked with stakeholders in Nigeria 
to create a multi-level system that 
allowed disputing parties to choose 
their mediation path and then 
report back to the formal court. 
“The conveyor belt between state 
and non-state actors is deeply fl uid, 
which is incredibly problematic,” 
said a participant. “When is a 
representative of the state serving 
in his offi cial capacity? Is the police 
offi cer whipping a person after a 
trial serving as a police offi cer or a 
functionary of the state?” Concurred 
an IGO participant: “What happens 
when you have a multiplicity of 
regimes and legal structures. Who is 
the preeminent authority?” 
Mr. Stephen Logan, UK Cross Government, shared his insights on how UK SSR 
actors developed effective assessments and fostered inter-agency collaboration.
14
SSR STAKEHOLDERS
Participants discussed the tension 
between donors’ desires to create 
a justice system modeled on 
Western best practices and local 
stakeholders’ desires to preserve 
a system that honors existing legal 
structures and dispute resolution 
practices. “Donors don’t want to 
put money into customary law. 
It’s very labor-intensive to go into 
the villages and talk to the chiefs 
about where people go to get 
justice,” said an IGO participant. 
“Access to justice means choice, 
accessibility, and affordability. 
It doesn’t mean what we think it 
means; it means what local citizens 
perceive as justice.” However a 
state decides to structure its justice 
system, it should provide for rule of 
law, ensuring that citizens’ rights 
are protected and that laws are 
administered effectively and fairly. 
INTERLOCUTORS
In instances when an assessment 
is not conducted jointly with the 
recipient government, SSR teams 
should strive to fi nd an interlocutor, 
a prominent stakeholder who can 
access the key players, explain their 
motivations, and help SSR teams 
identify levers for change. “Finding 
those people is really a challenge,” 
said a government civilian agency 
participant. But when SSR teams can 
fi nd these allies, they are invaluable 
guides to navigating the complex 
milieu of host nation institutions, 
stakeholders, and processes. 
Interlocutors can help SSR teams 
evaluate their fi ndings and “ground 
the truth,” explaining the difference 
between political positioning and 
on-the-the-ground realities. 
Interlocutors can also help 
teams identify spoilers, those 
individuals or groups who benefi t 
from upending the peace process, 
and devise strategies to co-opt 
and contain them. However, 
interlocutors themselves bear 
close study as they have and may 
represent a plethora of varying 
interests. “The host nation is not 
a monolithic institution,” said an 
NGO representative. “There are 
multiple players, each of which 
seeks to promote its self-interest.” 
Concurred a government civilian 
agency representative: “If they 
belong to an NGO or are private 
consultants, they may have 
relationships with government 
agencies that taint their data — and 
their perspectives.”
SPOILERS AND CROOKS
As part of their assessment, SSR 
teams will be studying corruption 
— how it affects different sectors 
differently, the complexities with 
which it is conducted, and tipping 
points that can be leveraged to 
drive reform. Since corruption 
and human rights violations are 
usually systemic in post-confl ict 
environments, SSR teams typically 
interact directly with individuals and 
groups responsible for perpetrating 
Pictured from left to right: Colonel Greg Hermsmeyer, US Department of Defense (DoD); 
Peter Wilson, Libra Advisory Group Ltd.; and Steven Petersen, US DoD, discussed the 
role of non-state actors in providing security and justice to local citizens.
In countries with weak institutions, ‘The conveyor 
belt between state and non-state actors is deeply 
problematic,’ said a participant. ‘When is a 
representative of the state serving in his ofﬁ cial 
capacity? Is the police ofﬁ cer whipping a person 
after a trial serving as a police ofﬁ cer or a 




violence and corruption. Rather 
than preserving ideological purity by 
refusing to work with “spoilers and 
crooks,” as one participant called 
potential agents of opposition, 
actors should maintain their focus 
on their overarching goals. “SSR 
work is about change management,” 
said a government civilian agency 
participant. “We need to develop 
effective strategies for co-opting, 
containing, or eliminating people 
who are impediments to change.” 
This participant stated that spoilers 
must be managed carefully to avoid 
disruption to the peace process. 
“Most of us don’t have a choice 
on whether we work with crooks,” 
said an IGO representative. 
“And so we give them some kind 
of responsibility, so that they 
won’t work against what we are 
doing.” This can often work well. 
An IGO member cited his work 
to co-opt a spoiler into serving 
as an interlocutor for an African 
disarmament, demobilization, and 
reintegration (DDR) program. During 
the course of working with his new 
interlocutor, the IGO member was 
able to unearth his rational self-
interest, which was to avoid being 
assassinated by his own troops, 
and use that as an incentive to 
involve him in disarming other 
rebel troops. Other times, the host 
nation itself can be the driver in 
co-opting or eliminating potential 
spoilers. Several participants shared 
examples of host government 
institutions initiating a self-
assessment to maintain control of 
the discovery process. And an IGO 
participant cited a host nation’s 
decision to simply reduce the 
budget of a problematic non-state 
security force, rather than take it 
on directly or try and co-opt it into 
adopting new best practices around 
ethics and human rights, a likely 
unwinnable strategy. 
Several participants challenged the 
idea of using the words “spoilers 
and crooks,” which they saw as 
unnecessarily pejorative labels 
applied by Western outsiders who 
were infusing their own cultural 
perspectives on another system. 
While many fragile and failed states 
do not adhere to Western best 
practices around governance and use 
patronage and corruption to reward 
the few at the expense of the many, 
these systems are often viewed as 
legitimate and acceptable in their 
country, they stated. In addition, 
civil servants in fragile states are 
frequently not paid a living wage — 
if they are paid anything at all. As 
a consequence, state employees, 
whether civilian or defense, must 
often barter publicly owned goods to 
maintain their standard of living and 
provide for their families. To these 
state employees, these practices are 
not corrupt, but simply a strategy 
for survival. ••
The workshop afforded participants with the opportunity to hear SSR best practices 
from a wide array of international actors.
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PREPARING AND EXECUTING 
AN ASSESSMENT
Participants discussed the tension 
between the desire to conduct a 
comprehensive SSR assessment 
and the political reality that they 
typically face, where they are 
called in to address a specifi c issue, 
such as intelligence or policing. 
Before entering a country, most 
teams will conduct a background, 
or country, study to get a lay of 
the land, key players, and issues. 
Then, when they are in-country, 
SSR teams will perform related 
assessments such as threat, risk, 
and confl ict analyses to look at 
interdependencies and core issues 
that cannot be captured in a 
top-level security analysis. Tools 
such as a confl ict analysis allow 
actors to examine root causes 
which may be systemic and diverge 
from institutional accounts of 
confl ict drivers. For example, two 
participants cited issues surrounding 
cattle confl icts, whether caused 
by thievery or disputes over bride 
prices, as core confl ict issues in 
the countries of Pakistan and South 
Sudan, respectively. Programs that 
fail to address core issues will 




Conﬂ ict analyses allow actors to 
examine root causes of violence which 
may diverge from institutional accounts 
of these drivers. ”
“
Participants worked together in breakout 
groups to build an assessment strategy 
and brainstorm their approach to tackling 
complex security challenges.
Colonel Greg Hermsmeyer, who is spearheading the US DoD’s efforts to create a 




Using an iterative approach allows 
actors to vet the integrity of their 
data and assumptions, develop 
critical relationships, and measure 
results for smaller-scale programs. 
“Governments hate it when you use 
a deliberately modest, iterative 
approach,” said a participant. “They 
don’t want to read reports about 
what you don’t know.”
Narrowing focus also acknowledges 
the reality of time pressures. 
Participants talked extensively about 
assessment timetables and the 
pressure teams face to do a deep 
dive on institutions in a constrained 
timeframe, often as few as one to 
three weeks. In an ideal state, teams 
would be able to take six months or a 
year to work closely with host nations 
to systematically gather information 
and help support local ownership. 
However, that typically is not 
possible, given political pressures to 
achieve results and limited resources. 
Nonetheless, obtaining accurate 
information is vital, as it can take 
years and millions of dollars to 
correct programs based on bad data.
Time and resource constraints can 
make it tempting for SSR teams to 
apply tools from their playbook. 
“We rush to design solutions to 
problems that we have not yet 
fully identifi ed,” stated a defense 
representative. “We need to do 
more strategic thinking around the 
problem fi rst.” The civilian world 
should learn from the military, which 
invests considerable resources in 
gathering intelligence, conducting 
ongoing assessments, and modeling 
different approaches and outcomes 
through scenarios, he stated, even as 
he acknowledged that this approach 
may not be feasible for SSR teams.
SSR assessments should provide 
both a detailed look at the wartime 
and peacetime roles of state and 
non-state security forces, analyzing 
infrastructure, equipment, human 
capital, and budgeting, among 
other issues. “The security and 
justice assessment should provide 
information on how much, how long, 
and how costly the process will be,” 
said a think tank representative. “It 
should make parties smarter about 
what is needed, how institutions are 
viewed by local constituencies, and 
what parties are desirable partners.” 
CREATING A BASELINE
Creating a baseline, or a metrics-
driven snapshot of security 
institutions’ current state, is 
absolutely essential as it provides 
the yardstick for evaluating 
whether new programs improve 
institutional performance. Yet actors 
often face challenges gathering 
baseline data and selling host and 
donor governments on the concept 
of measuring performance on an 
ongoing basis. 
To circumnavigate these issues, 
actors should educate stakeholders 
about the importance of metrics 
and their use as an international 
best practice, acquire their buy-in 
on the need for such data, and then 
work with them to gather it. “How 
can a host nation truly own an SSR 
program if it can’t say whether or 
not it is successful?” asked an IGO 
member. However, actors must avoid 
the temptation of imposing baselines, 
which could undermine host nation 
support for reform initiatives.
Participants discussed the 
impossibility of gathering 
comprehensive data in the two- 
to three-week timeframe teams 
typically to conduct assessments. 
Often records are missing or 
inconclusive and must be pieced 
together and painstakingly 
vetted for inaccuracy and 
fraud. Sometimes data has to 
be created whole-cloth via in-
person interviews or other means. 
Participants discussed actors’ 
interventions in Haiti, where 
the militia had no records of its 
offi cer corps; Liberia and Southern 
Sudan, where ghost workers 
infl ated the number of troops (and 
commanders’ paychecks); and 
Aceh, where offi cials underreported 
the number of combatants by 80 
percent or more, as examples of 
the types of situations teams face 
in the fi eld. 
Participants offered strategies for 
developing data, such as interviewing 
a broad range of stakeholders 
including permanent secretaries, 
magistrate offi cials, political 
appointees’ support personnel, 
and NGO staff; leaving the nation’s 
capitol to gain the perspectives of 
state and regional offi cials; and 
reading media reports. Obviously, 
teams also have to vet the accuracy 
of information supplied by host 
nation stakeholders, who may not be 
motivated to tell the truth. 
Once procedures and programs 
have been established by which 
baselines can be developed 
and verifi ed, host governments 
should create new structures and 
processes to prompt institutions 
to improve their performance. 
One participant offered a best 
practice from Southern Sudan, 
where the state has set up a 
two-part structure: convening an 
inter-ministry appraisal committee 
to evaluate donor programs and 
funding to make sure they are in 
line with governmental priorities; 
and linking agency budgets to SSR 
priorities, only giving agencies their 
funding when they have achieved 
their objectives. This structure 
aligns donors and agency initiatives 
and provides a mechanism for 
enforcing compliance. 
Pictured from left to right: Uju Agomah, PRAWA, and Geraldine Schwaller, INSCRIRE 
Human Rights.
Actors should educate host nation 
stakeholders about the importance of 
metrics and their use as an international 
best practice. ‘How can a host nation 
truly own an SSR program if it can’t say 





Participants discussed the capabilities and personal qualities SSR teams and their 




Participants discussed the 
composition of assessment teams 
and key roles. Chief among them: 
the SSR team leader. Among the 
requirements for this important 
role: The team lead must be able to 
assemble a diverse team of experts 
with wide-ranging sectoral skills and 
regional expertise and help team 
members focus on the right issues 
and capture the full range of local 
nuances. He or she will need to 
maintain cultural openness and be 
able to build trust with a wide array 
of stakeholders, from donors and 
other interagency and international 
SSR practitioners, presidents and 
agency ministers, to mission chiefs 
and attachés, to members of youth 
gangs and militias, and NGO workers, 
among others. He or she should be 
adept at navigating the complex 
cultural and political milieu on the 
ground, using expert language skills, 
negotiation expertise, and insight to 
make sense of critical information, 
processes, and relationships. The 
team lead should also possess 
effective change management skills, 
helping the host nation develop a 
vision for their SSR initiative and 
take the hard steps to achieve it. As 
the most visible SSR practitioner, he 
or she serves as a bridge between 
military and civilian communities, 
working with both groups to build 
effective partnerships. “Is this person 
the bionic man or woman?” asked 
an NGO member to group laughter, 
as participants acknowledged that 
they were building an ideal, rather 
than identifying a particular person. 
However, an effective leader will 
know his or her weaknesses and 
select team members that provide 
complementary skills to compensate 
for them. 
SSR team leaders seek to deploy 
a team with the right sectoral 
experience for a particular 
assessment, recognizing that 
changing priorities may mean that 
they will not possess the full set 
of capabilities. In addition, while 
practitioners possess a signifi cant 
knowledge base about their sector, 
they may not always understand how 
to build capacity. As a consequence, 
it can be useful to have a program 
designer on the team. 
BEST PRACTICES 
Participants offered best practices 
for optimizing the effectiveness of 
SSR assessments: 
•  Use country teams to build political 
will for SSR and facilitate the 
assessment process. If country 
teams run into host government 
resistance, they can use their state 
departments and regional bureaus 
to push for reform. 
•  Build consensus around the real 
issues: Are the issues that the 
host country thinks are signifi cant 
consistent with on-the-ground 
realities? And are donor priorities 
realistic and achievable? For 
example, if a donor mandates a 
record keeping system for the police 
force and the illiteracy rate in the 
police is high, program designers 
will need to address literacy before 
tackling larger issues. 
•  Invest in building assessment 
capacity. Consider recruiting 
personnel from other professions, 
such as retired military personnel, 
to build a broader talent pool. 
Provide new recruits with a 
wide range of training and skills 
development opportunities and 
put them in multiple contexts so 
that they can hone their expertise 
and fl exibility. 
•  Make sure that teams fully 
analyze problems before driving 
to solutions. Military intelligence 
gathering can provide a compelling 
example of how to conduct an 
effective evaluation of a problem 
and inform solution design. 
•  Find the right partners on the 
ground who can help guide your 
work and interpret fi ndings. Local 
NGOs can serve a valuable role 
as interlocutors. However, SSR 
actors may need to make changes 
to their working practices to 
preserve NGO independence 
and neutrality and avoid the 
appearance that they are 
colluding with the military. 
•  Ensure that SSR teams evaluate 
the full set of interdependencies 
by performing related analyses 
such as threat, risk, and confl ict 
assessments. Many SSR programs 
have failed to achieve their 
objectives because the full range 
of security issues, including 
invisible power structures, lack of 
capacity, or the inability of civilian 
leadership to manage fi ghting 
forces, were never addressed. 
•  Avoid reinventing the wheel, by 
borrowing other organizations’ 
frameworks. Participants cited 
resources from the Geneva 
Centre for the Democratic 
Control of Armed Forces; the 
Global Facilitation Network; 
the Organisation for Economic 
Co-Operation and Development 
(OECD); the US Agency for 
International Development; the 
United Nations; the World Bank; 
and the Governments of the 
Netherlands, Sweden, and the 
United Kingdom as informing 
the development of their own 
frameworks. In particular, the OECD 
has taken a leadership role in the 
fi eld, developing a comprehensive 
handbook on how to translate SSR 
principles into action. 
•  Learn from international actors 
who take a whole-of-government 
approach, convening SSR task 
forces for interagency decision 
making and strategy setting, 
designing fl exible funding, and 
broadening teams’ skills with 
cross-department assignments.
Pictured: Helena Vazquez, Folke Bernadotte Academy, and Ana Kantor. 
SSR practitioners have a wealth of 
resources to draw from as they work 
to construct their own frameworks.  
In addition, they should learn from 
international actors who take a whole-of-




•  Recognize that all methodologies 
will necessarily have gaps. As the 
team continues to deploy across 
multiple fi eld assessments, they 
will gain better insights into 
framework gaps and be able to 
evolve the methodology. 
•  Look at the full range of actors 
providing security services. 
Participants cited policing as a 
particularly complex sector to 
evaluate, as so many different 
agencies provide these services. 
•  Create a strategic plan and develop 
a slate of activities that will build 
up to achieving stated goals. Agree 
on the deliverables and build 
in a monitoring and evaluation 
component to ensure that 
initiatives are achieving objectives. 
•  Deploy a highly capable team, but 
also one that is fl exible enough to 
respond to new information and 
change course if required. Team 
members should be experts in their 
own sectors, but also conversant 
enough with other sectors that they 
can cover them. 
•  Make sure that programs are 
fi nancially viable — or they will 
not be sustainable over the long-
term. “We often make decisions 
that are not fi scally sound,” said 
a government civilian agency 
participant. “For example, 
Afghanistan has a 134,000 member 
military. That is simply not viable 
fi nancially. A better example would 
be Liberia, where the government 
did downsize its force.” 
•  Since most programs involve a 
“right-sizing” of security forces, 
ensure that vetting is thorough 
— but not overly aggressive. 
Effective vetting should maintain 
institutional knowledge and 
preserve continuity of services, 
while removing individuals who do 
not meet minimum standards or 
were involved in corruption and 
violence. If SSR practitioners use 
criteria to screen out the majority 
of highly screened staff, they 
run the danger of destroying or 
crippling that institution. ••
Pictured: Gloria Jean Garland, US Agency for International Development; and 
Lieutenant Colonel Surenda Rawal, Army of Nepal.
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Security sector reform provides 
national and external actors with 
the framework, insights, and 
tools they need to help support 
the development of fragile 
states. However, the process 
of strengthening and rebuilding 
service delivery, institutions, 
and processes is by no means a 
straightforward or easily navigable 
one. Practitioners are well aware 
that their work plays out on a 
national stage; that political will 
for reform processes is often 
tenuous; and that ill-considered 
actions can set back fl edgling 
initiatives, sometimes permanently. 
As a consequence, external actors 
have sought to increase the 
probability of success by working 
with host nation owners to create 
an enabling environment where 
stakeholders can design programs 
that fi t within the country context, 
sequence initiatives to address 
critical priorities, and achieve 
desired results. 
Data frames the entire SSR process, 
informing assessment design and 
execution, creating a baseline and 
shaping ensuing reform programs, 
and providing the yardstick for 
measuring results. Despite external 
actors’ desire to ground their 
Conclusion
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Data frames the entire SSR process, 
informing assessment design and execution, 
creating a baseline and shaping ensuing 
reform programs, and providing the 
yardstick for measuring results. ”
“
Pictured from left to right: Julie 
Werbel, US Agency for International 
Development; Major David Dosier, US 
Army; and Helena Vazquez.
work in quantitative data, the 
assessment will necessarily be 
qualitative, refl ecting national 
actors’ perceptions, available 
data, and the strengths and 
biases of the assessment team. 
However, the assessment also 
provides an important tool for 
capturing national actors’ insights 
into the areas of greatest need 
and potential entry points for 
effective action. As a consequence, 
teams should strive to ensure 
that the assessment provides an 
accurate a picture of how public 
goods and services are delivered 
regardless of their providers. 
While an individual assessment is a 
snapshot of a moment in time, the 
framework itself is a living tool. In 
the hands of skilled practitioners, 
an assessment framework is 
constantly changing, evolving to 
address newly identifi ed gaps and 
to incorporate new learnings and 
best practices. SSR actors have 
another valuable resource as they 
strive to enhance the effectiveness 
of this important tool: other 
actors. Participants in Security 
Sector Reform represented some 
of the world’s leading thinkers on 
this important issue. Presenters 
shared a wealth of insights 
into how to design effective 
assessments, the successes and 
shortcomings of leading tools, 
and how to maximize the success 
of the assessment process. As 
actors deploy around the globe, 
they will be able to draw on the 
insights and frameworks offered by 
their international counterparts, 
using their knowledge and tools 
to increase their effectiveness 
and build political will for SSR 
initiatives that will help strengthen 
fragile states.  ••
Participants benefi tted from the insights of a wide array of international practitioners 
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Security Sector Reform: The Art 
of Assessment was designed and 
facilitated by Mr. Eric Scheye, 
an independent consultant 
in justice and security sector 
development and confl ict 
management who has worked for 
numerous governments, as well 
as the Organisation for Economic 
Co-Operation and Development 
(OECD), the Organization for 
Security and Co-operation in 
Europe, and the United Nations. 
He also has had assignments 
with various research institutes 
and non-governmental 
organizations, such as the 
Democratic Control of the 
Armed Forces, Clingendael 
Institute, United States Institute 
of Peace, and Saferworld. Mr. 
Scheye’s fi eld assignments 
include a UK-sponsored 
integrated justice program 
in Yemen; an assessment of 
non-state justice and security 
networks in Southern Sudan, 
performed for the US and UK; 
assignments in Brazil, Argentina, 
Guatemala, Kyrgyzstan, and 
Belize; and postings with the 
United Nations Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations and 
United Nations Development 
Programme to Albania, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, East Timor, 
Honduras, Kosovo, and Serbia. 
In addition, Mr. Scheye has 
worked in the policy arena, 
writing reports for international 
governments and think 
tanks on justice and security 
programming and participating 
in the development of OECD’s 
security sector reform 
implementation framework. 
Workshop Facilitator
For more information about CSRS, its philosophy, and programs, 
please visit www.csrs-nps.org.

